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The evolution of extreme 
cooperation via shared  
dysphoric experiences
Harvey Whitehouse1, Jonathan Jong1,2, Michael D. Buhrmester1, Ángel Gómez3, 
Brock Bastian1,4, Christopher M. Kavanagh1, Martha Newson1, Miriam Matthews5, 
Jonathan A. Lanman6, Ryan McKay7 & Sergey Gavrilets8
Willingness to lay down one’s life for a group of non-kin, well documented historically and 
ethnographically, represents an evolutionary puzzle. Building on research in social psychology, we 
develop a mathematical model showing how conditioning cooperation on previous shared experience 
can allow individually costly pro-group behavior to evolve. The model generates a series of predictions 
that we then test empirically in a range of special sample populations (including military veterans, 
college fraternity/sorority members, football fans, martial arts practitioners, and twins). Our empirical 
results show that sharing painful experiences produces “identity fusion” – a visceral sense of oneness – 
which in turn can motivate self-sacrifice, including willingness to fight and die for the group. Practically, 
our account of how shared dysphoric experiences produce identity fusion helps us better understand 
such pressing social issues as suicide terrorism, holy wars, sectarian violence, gang-related violence, 
and other forms of intergroup conflict.
Across the historical and ethnographic records, from warriors and soldiers to suicide bombers and religious mar-
tyrs, humans have proven capable of not just cooperating within groups, but of making extremely costly personal 
sacrifices for them. While altruism towards kin is well understood evolutionarily1,2 extreme self-sacrifice for the 
sake of non-kin still represents a puzzle. Psychologists have offered a range of explanations for how threatening 
experiences can trigger increased groupishness3–10, but these do not address willingness to make the ultimate 
sacrifice in defense of a group. There is little evidence that such sacrifices, including suicide terrorism, are linked 
to psychopathology11. Rather, a growing body of experimental evidence suggest that willingness to fight and 
die for the group may be motivated by “identity fusion” – a normal (i.e., not psychopathological) form of group 
alignment in which the boundary between personal and social identity becomes porous, producing a visceral 
sense of oneness with the group12–17. Driven by the conviction that group members share essence with oneself 
in ways that can transcend even the bonds of kinship, persons strongly fused to a group report willingness to 
engage in self-sacrifice. The form that self-sacrifice takes may vary widely in different cultures and historical 
periods but we argue that one of the pathways to extreme pro-group action, whatever culturally distinctive forms 
it happens to take, is identity fusion. The identity fusion construct builds on a classic theoretical tradition in psy-
chology – social identity theory18. Initial construct validation studies found that strongly fused individuals report 
perceiving shared essential qualities with a group as well as a sense of reciprocal strength19. The identity fusion 
construct is well grounded in theory and has demonstrated high predictive validity across dozens of experiments, 
cross-sectional surveys, and longitudinal studies with specialist populations as diverse as revolutionary fighters20, 
victims of atrocities21, and civilians loyal to their country22,23. Overall researchers have shown that identity fusion 
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is a cause of extreme cooperation across cultures, in contrast with the less extreme forms of cooperation moti-
vated by identification (alignment with a group category) and ethnic psychology (the acquisition, storage, and 
deployment of socially learned group identity markers)22,24.
One explanation for the extreme cooperation caused by identity fusion is that groupmates are perceived 
as “psychological kin”15,24, i.e. that the the human brain, while “wired” for sacrificial behavior towards close 
kin, makes “mistakes” by facilitating pro-group behavior irrespective of genetic relatedness. The impetus for 
self-sacrifice by group members is often couched in the language of kinship; and empirical studies show that the 
effects of identity fusion on pro-national outcomes is partially mediated by feelings of family-like ties toward fel-
low countrymen21,22,25,26. Various religious, military, and terrorist organizations attempt to promote self-sacrifice 
by exploiting these kin-related instincts27. Although kin selection represents a powerful driver of many biological 
phenomena1,2, the “psychological kin” explanation is not completely satisfactory. First, it is difficult to imagine 
how biological mechanisms underlying the“psychological kin” phenomenon could evolve given low genetic relat-
edness in ancestral human groups (and in our closest relatives – chimpanzees)28,29 and high costs of self-sacrificial 
behavior. Second, mechanisms for kin detection in humans15,30 should act against perceiving unrelated persons 
as close biological relatives. Finally, in a recent survey of participants in the Libyan uprising of 2011, thousands of 
whom died in combat, frontline fighters were more likely to choose genetically unrelated fellow revolutionaries 
in preference to family as the group with which they are most fused20. Therefore alternatives to the “psychological 
kin” explanation need to be explored.
Recent psychological research provides preliminary evidence that a powerful cause of identity fusion is sharing 
experiences, especially dysphoric (painful and frightening) ones, with group members15,20,22,24. Dysphoric expe-
riences may become entrenched as self-defining memories that similarly define fellow group members (Fig. 1). 
This mechanism of group solidarity is inherently more extreme, and powerful, than oft-cited forms of group 
commitment such as identification31, which have been reliably associated with collective euphoria and group 
performance32. Research indicates that when the group is threatened, fused persons override self-preservation 
concerns to protect the group at any cost15.
This proximate explanation for self-sacrifice motivates us to explore the evolutionary implications of con-
ditioning cooperation on shared past experience. We posit that willingness to perform costly acts for the group 
is a behavioral strategy that evolved in our ancestors to enable success in high-risk collective activities and 
between-group conflicts. Groups whose members fused together after experiencing shared dysphoria (i.e., events 
that negatively impact fitness) would be more likely to prevail in subsequent between-group conflicts in spite of 
their handicap. Ancestral groups that did not fuse when experiencing shared dysphoria would be less likely to 
survive in between-group competition. In benign conditions, the willingness to sacrifice for the group would be 
too costly to sustain. As such, identity fusion should be sensitive to cues of shared dysphoria within the group 
and to threats imposed from outside the group. Our explanation of individually-costly but group-beneficial 
behavior thus focuses on evolved coalitionary psychology and tribal instincts33,34 but emphasizes genetic rather 
than cultural effects and conditional rather than unconditional expression of self-sacrifice. Here we provide sys-
tematic and robust modeling and empirical tests for our explanatory framework. First we investigate theoreti-
cally whether conditioning cooperation on types of shared experience can evolve by natural selection. On these 
grounds we then test the predictions of our models empirically, via correlational, quasi-experimental, and exper-
imental studies. Our findings support the hypothesis that shared dysphoric experiences produce identity fusion 
and this in turn predicts willingness to fight and die for the group.
Results
Mathematical models and theoretical predictions. Our models included many of the standard 
assumptions of theoretical approaches to within-group cooperation in evolutionary biology. We treated indi-
vidual willingness to cooperate with group-mates as a genetically controlled trait1,2. Individual fitness was deter-
mined by an outcome of a collective goods game35 that the group members participate in. Collective action of 
group members can be thwarted by free-riding36; this problem can be solved to some extent by kin selection, 
reciprocity, punishment, or group selection37–39. Here we offer a novel solution – conditioning cooperation on 
shared prior experience. In our model, some groups facing a collective action previously had fitness enhancing 
experiences while others had fitness decreasing experiences. Below we show that conditioning individual efforts 
Figure 1. Shared dysphoric experiences. (a) Bruises and welts from Brazilian Jiu Jitsu belt whipping gauntlets 
(Photos: Guillaume Huni). (b) Memorial in Misrata to the thousands of revolutionaries in Libya who laid down 
their lives in the 2011 uprising (Photo: Harvey Whitehouse).
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in a collective action on these qualities of previously shared experience can evolve by natural selection and can 
help to solve the free-riding problem. Our model predicts that groups undergoing fitness-decreasing experiences 
are more likely to contribute substantially to future collective actions. That is, shared past negative experiences 
can augment future pro-group behavior increasing the overall fitness of both the group and its individual mem-
bers. Our results however predict a particular evolved social psychology that biases humans to greatly increase 
cooperation if their groups go through shared negative experiences.
Models. More specifically, we considered a population of individuals living in a large number G of groups of 
constant size n. Generations are discrete and non-overlapping. We focused on a single collective action35,40,41 that 
groups attempt to accomplish. The effort of individual i in group j towards the group’s success in the collective 
action was modeled as a nonnegative continuous variable zij; the total group j effort of is = ∑Z zj i ij. We defined 
the individual payoff from the collective action as
= + −f bP cz1 , (1)ij j ij
where b and c are constant benefit and cost parameters. Function Pj = Pj(Zj) gives the normalized value of the 
resource produced by group j as a result of collective effort; we normalize Pj relative to a maximum possible 
reward size (0 ≤ Pj ≤ 1). Relative individual fertility was proportional to f f/ij j, where f j is the average payoff in 
group j.
There are two general types of collective actions in which our ancestors were almost certainly engaged. The 
first includes group activities such as defense from predators, some types of hunting or food collection, use of fire, 
etc. The success of a particular group in these activities largely does not depend on the actions of neighboring 
groups. We will refer to such collective actions as “us vs. nature” contests and define the relative success as
=
+
P
Z
Z Z (2a)
j
j
j 0
refs 41,42. Here Z0 is a “half-saturation” constant; the larger Z0, the more group effort Zj is needed for the success. 
The second type of collective action, which we will refer to as “us vs. them” contests, includes direct conflicts and/
or competition with other groups over territory and other resources such as mating. The success of one group 
in an “us vs. them” contest means failure or reduced success for other groups. In these contests, we defined the 
relative success as
=
∑
P
Z
Z (2b)j
j
k k
where the sum is over all groups43,44. We studied “us vs. nature” and “us vs. them” contests separately. Our formu-
lation implied there was an incentive to free-ride on the efforts of group-mates36,35. The collective action models 
introduced above belong to a general class of the Volunteer dilemmas45,46, where individuals would prefer to 
free-ride on the effort of their group-mates but if nobody else is willing to do it, it may become advantageous to 
volunteer in spite of the costs involved. It is important to realize that in our models, individuals make contribu-
tions to a collective good not because they are “altruistic” but because this increases their fitness.
We extended the above standard model by assuming that groups differ in previous experience which both 
contributes to the overall probability of the group’s survival and can potentially condition individual cooper-
ation. Specifically, we posited that a random proportion π of the groups previously had an euphoric (that is, 
payoff-increasing) experience whereas a proportion 1 − π had a dysphoric (that is, payoff-decreasing) experience. 
For example, one can think of an “endowment” (e.g. a forest with fruits, or pigs) that the group has initially but 
may lose because of some random exogenous effects. The loss of the endowment would then represent a dys-
phoric event experienced by all group members. The previous experience (specified by an indicator variable Ej = 1 
for euphoric groups and to 0 for dysphoric groups) and the relative success Pj in the focal collective action jointly 
controlled the group’s survival probability which is set to be proportional to
= + − .S hE h P(1 ) (3)j j j
Here 0 ≤ h ≤ 1 is a constant parameter measuring the importance of the previous experience for the group’s sur-
vival. The equation above uses a simple linear function to specify how previous experience (shared by all group 
members by assumption) affects group survival. In our model, given everything else the same, the probability 
of group survival S in “euphoric” groups is larger by h than that in “dysphoric” groups (Seuphoric = h + (1 − h)P, 
Sdisphoric = (1 − h)P)). Groups that did not survive were replaced by the offspring of surviving groups (see Methods 
and the Supplementary Information, SI). In our model, group-level selection favors large individual efforts zij 
(which would increase the probability of group survival Sj), while individual-level selection may favor low efforts 
zij (which would reduce the individual costs term czij)47,48.
We assumed that previous experience not only controlled the group’s survival probability, but could also 
potentially influence individual efforts in the collective action, by triggering different behavioral modules. 
Specifically we postulated two independent (unlinked) loci with allelic effects xij and yij, the first of which was 
expressed in individuals with euphoric experience, so that in such individuals zij = xij, and the second was 
expressed in individuals with dysphoric experience, so that in such individuals zij = yij. In each individual, only 
one gene was expressed, and all individuals from the same group expressed the same gene. Initially, the allelic 
effects in both genes in all individuals were very close to zero and the individuals did not contribute much to the 
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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collective action. We allowed for mutation, recombination, and migration. We were interested in whether gene 
effects would increase over time and whether the increase would be similar or asymmetric between the two genes, 
that is, whether individuals would condition their cooperation on shared past experience.
Our model operated on an evolutionary time-scale focusing on genetic changes leading to the evolution of 
pro-social behavior conditioned on shared past experience. Individuals’ feelings underlying the development of 
identity fusion during the individual’s life-time were not modeled explicitly. However, to the extent that identity 
fusion mediates the relationship between shared past experience and future pro-group actions of an individual 
(as we show below experimentally), our results also concern the effects of shared experience on identity fusion.
Results and predictions. To study our models we used both analytical approximations (shown in the SI) and 
individual-based simulations. To remove the effects of genetic relatedness, groups were formed randomly at the 
beginning of each generation. We measured the averages of euphoric x and dysphoric y efforts across the whole 
system at a (stochastic) equilibrium state to which the system evolves. Figure 2 illustrates the effects of five differ-
ent parameters on the contribution to collective action in the two contests in euphoric and dysphoric groups (see 
also the SI). Overall, our results lead to the following predictions. First, previous shared experience does affect 
individual behavior in collective action (x and y depend on parameters π and h specifying past experience). 
Second, dysphoric experience makes individuals contribute more than euphoric experience ( >y x). Third, more 
intense experience results in stronger effects on prosociality (ratio y x/  increases with h). The intuition behind 
these results is very simple: groups in poor initial conditions (e.g. with a reduced endowment or fitness) really 
need to cooperate in order to make it into the future while those in better initial conditions may “afford” some-
what reduced efforts. Fourth, the effect of shared dysphoria on prosocial behavior is much stronger if groups 
compete directly against other groups (“us vs. them” contests) than if they cooperate against nature (“us vs. 
nature” contests). Moreover, the effect is stronger in smaller groups (decreasing n increases x and y). The last two 
predictions are in line with earlier comparisons of “us vs. them” and ‘us vs. nature” games41,42. The explanations 
are that “us vs. them” games impose stronger selection on the underlying genes than “us vs. nature” games41,42 and 
that free-riding is a more effective strategy in larger populations36. We expect that the effects of the above factors 
on identity fusion will parallel those on individual actions captured explicitly by our model.
Our models were designed to study the effects of previous experience in the absence of genetic relatedness 
between group members. We can contrast our results with those for the case when group members are genetically 
related but the effects of previous experience are absent. The corresponding “us vs. nature” and “us vs. them” 
contests were studied previously41,42. With biologically realistic small values of average genetic relatedness28, the 
values predicted by these results can be significantly smaller than those observed in Fig. 2 (see SI). Of course, we 
do not know realistic values of some important parameters which control the model’s predictions. Nevertheless 
our results suggest that effects of shared dysphoric experience on willingness to perform individually-costly 
pro-group acts can potentially be stronger than those of genetic relatedness.
In the models studied above, each individual values the group’s success equally which implies equal degree 
of identity fusion. In the SI we use results from refs 40,41 to show that highly-fused individuals will exhibit 
more pro-group sentiments than low-fused individuals. In particular, under conditions of strong between-group 
competition the model predicts that the efforts of highly-fused individuals will be so high that their fitness 
will be almost zero. That is, highly-fused individuals are predicted to effectively sacrifice themselves for their 
groups. Reference 15 provides complementary experimental evidence on the willingness of such individuals to 
self-sacrifice for their groups.
Empirical tests. Our models make general predictions concerning cooperation in collective actions. Next, 
we test five specific predictions focusing on a particularly interesting and extreme type of cooperation - will-
ingness to self-sacrifice for the group. Because we are interested in general behavioral predispositions, we chose 
a diverse set of samples in eight studies totaling 2,836 individual participants, including citizens of countries, 
fans of football teams, military veterans, college fraternity/sorority members, martial arts practitioners, and both 
monozygotic and dyzygotic twins. We ran a total of eight studies, employing correlational (Studies 1, 2, 4, 5, 6), 
quasi-experimental (Studies 1, 3, 8), and experimental (Study 8) methodologies.
Hypothesis 1: Shared experience promotes willingness to preform extreme pro-group action. We ran two studies to 
test this hypothesis15. Both studies distinguish everyday experiences from self-defining experiences 
(i.e., those that are vividly remembered and are central to one’s self-concept)49. In Study 1, American participants 
were more willing to cooperate (e.g. donate money, volunteer) to solve problems associated with either a 
natural disaster (N = 97) or a terrorist attack (N = 98) in the United States when they reported sharing more 
self-defining (r = 0.239, P = 0.001) and everyday experiences (r = 0.187, P = 0.009) with fellow Americans. 
In Study 2, Americans (N = 122) were asked about their willingness to endorse extreme, self-sacrificial 
pro-group actions. We also measured participants’ levels of identity fusion with their country. Shared experiences 
increased willingness to endorse extreme pro-group behaviors via increasing identity fusion. This held 
for both self-defining experiences, = . = . . .b SE CI0 4007( 0 0655), 95% [0 2842, 0 5377], and everyday experiences, 
= . = . . .b SE CI0 4210( 0 0733), 95% [0 2925, 0 5838].
Hypothesis 2: Shared dysphoric experiences more strongly motivate self-sacrifice for the group than euphoric 
experiences. To test this hypothesis we ran a study on English Premier League football fans (N = 725), 
a collection of modern ‘tribes’ that share dysphoric (e.g. team loss, relegation) and euphoric (e.g. winning cups, 
embarrassing rivals) experiences50. In Study 3, fans of the losing (i.e., dysphoria-producing) teams were more 
likely to moralize group-related actions (r = 0.109, P = 0.003) and choose to sacrifice themselves for the sake 
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of an ingroup member in the classic trolley dilemma (r = 0.120, P = 0.001) than fans of winning 
(i.e., euphoria-producing) teams. The effects of team support on self-sacrificial responses and pro-group moral 
endorsements were both mediated by identity fusion, = . = . . .b SE CI0 1216( 0 0405), 95% [0 0545, 0 2203] and 
= . = . . .b SE CI0 2976( 0 0687), 95% [0 1632, 0 4336], respectively. It is possible that high scores on the trolley 
dilemma reflect tendencies to self-harm in response to negative affect. Nevertheless, a more plausible explanation 
Figure 2. Effects of the benefit b, cost c, group size n, and the weight of previous experience h on the 
average individual efforts in euphoric groups x and dysphoric groups y. (a,b) “us vs. nature” contests with the 
frequency of euphoric groups π = 0.5. In these games, the value of π does not affect the outcomes. (c,d) “us vs. 
them” contests with π = 0.2. (e,f) “us vs. them” contests with π = 0.8. The height of the bars is also reflected in 
their color using the gray colormap (low values in black and high values in white; specific to each individual 
panel). Notice the difference in the y-scale between subgraphs.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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is that shared dysphoria motivates extreme cooperation via identity fusion, as high fused individuals of both 
unsuccessful and successful football teams were found to endorse self-sacrificial behaviour. In earlier studies of 
group competition involving monetary donations rather than self-reported endorsement of prosocial acts, losing 
groups increased their contributions while winning groups decreased it51,52.
Hypothesis 3: More intense experiences of shared dysphoria produce stronger effects on self-sacrifice for the 
group. We ran three studies to test this hypothesis. Military veterans vary widely in exposure to shared dys-
phoric events53,54, thus we surveyed U.S. combat veterans of the Vietnam War (N = 380) in Study 4. As predicted, 
greater exposure to shared dysphoric combat experiences (e.g. losing a close co-combatant in battle) predicted 
both identity fusion (r = 0.203, P < 0.0001) and willingness to provide support for veterans in need (r = 0.184, 
P < 0.0001). Combat experiences increased willingness to provide support to fellow veterans via increasing levels 
of identity fusion, = . = . . .b SE CI0 1026( 0 0290), 95% [0 0521, 0 1668]. In Study 5, past and current members 
(N = 146) of U.S. college fraternities and sororities who had undergone hazing and other such initiation rituals, 
were asked about the extent to which the initiation ritual was self-defining24. Perceived self-definingness of the 
experience predicted both identity fusion (r = 0.430, P < 0.0001) and expressed willingness to sacrifice self for 
group (r = 0.429, P < 0.0001). Self-definingness increased pro-group sacrifice by increasing identity fusion, 
= . = . . .b SE CI0 4246( 0 0839), 95% [0 2704, 0 6004]. Similarly, in Study 6, we used online advertisements to 
recruit Brazilian Jiu Jitsu (BJJ) practitioners (N = 564), as BJJ promotion events can involve either a painful 
belt-whipping gauntlet run or less severe practices. This provided an opportunity to compare a population with a 
significant degree of variation in the dysphoric arousal of important affiliative events, which practitioners are 
typically unaware of before joining (62.5% reported having “no idea” about their school’s graduation rituals before 
joining, while a further 16.1% had only “a vague idea”). Despite the significant heterogeneity involved in a world-
wide sample, we found that the intensity of belt promotions predicted levels of identity fusion (ρ = 0.135, 
P = 0.002), and that identity fusion predicted participants’ stated willingness to risk their lives fighting for the club 
(ρ = 0.542, P < 0.0001), as well as their willingness to donate time (ρ = 0.508, P < 0.0001) and make costly dona-
tions of potential prize money (ρ = 0.250, P < 0.0001) to the club. These relationships remained when controlling 
for other relevant factors, including age, sex, years training, group identification, and average time training per 
week. Mediation analyses also showed that elevated intensity of experiences increased participants’ willingness to 
endorse pro-group behaviors via increasing levels of identity fusion.
Hypothesis 4: The effect of shared dysphoria on prosocial behavior is stronger where groups compete directly against 
other groups, rather than if they cooperate against nature. Study 1 (see above) was designed to test hypothesis 4 as 
well as hypothesis 1. In Study 1, we found dysphoric contexts involving terrorists elicited more cooperation than 
those involving natural disasters, t(193) = 2.534, P = 0.012, Cohen’s d = 0.363.
Hypothesis 5: The effects of shared dysphoric experience on the willingness to perform pro-group acts can be stronger 
than those of genetic relatedness. We ran two studies to test this hypothesis. In Study 7, 198 participants either 
wrote about an experience that has shaped them (Experience), genetically transmitted traits (Genes), or the 
changing seasons (Control). Participants then imagined interacting with someone who shared the same experi-
ence, discovered a long lost sibling, or met a stranger, respectively. Both shared experience (M = 32.17, 
SD = 27.21) and shared biology (M = 13.66, SD = 17.31) increased identity fusion with the person, but shared 
experiences were a more powerful trigger, P < 0.001. Both shared experiences (M = 3.19, SD = 1.73) and shared 
genes (M = 2.79, SD = 1.75) similarly predicted trust for the other person, P = 0.173; however, shared genes 
(M = 4.82, SD = 2.19) predicted economic sacrifice more than shared experiences (M = 4.09, SD = 2.11, 
P = 0.045). Identity fusion mediated the relationship between shared experiences/genes and prosocial behavior, 
b = 1.120/0.562 (SE = 0.2763/0.1581), 95% CI . . . .[0 5967, 1 6696/0 2783, 0 8766]. This study partially supports the 
hypothesis, showing that shared experiences predict levels of identity fusion better than shared genes, and levels 
of trust as well as shared genes. In Study 8, 260 monozygotic and 246 dizygotic twins55 were asked about their 
shared experiences with their twins, as well as about how fused they were with their twins. Both zygosity 
(b = 0.755 (SE = 0.173), 95% CI [0.415, 1.094]) and shared experience (b = 0.267 (SE = 0.033), 95% CI [0.202, 
0.332]) independently predicted identity fusion. Furthermore, hierarchical regression analyses showed that 
shared experience continued to predict identity fusion even after controlling for shared genes.
Discussion
Overall our theoretical and empirical studies both suggest that shared dysphoric experiences are a powerful 
mechanism for promoting pro-group behaviors which under certain conditions can be extremely costly to the 
individuals concerned. Our ancestors had a common stake in their group’s fate, especially when facing existen-
tial threats. Under threatening conditions, having a shared evolutionary future likely was a more decisive fac-
tor in cooperation and self-sacrifice than shared ancestry (i.e., genetic relatedness). A pervasive source of these 
threats was highly variable environmental conditions during the Late Pleistocene56,57 making adaptation and 
survival difficult. Another potential source was competition with other human groups for resources and mating 
opportunities58–60.
Our model captures explicitly how individual efforts in public good games depend on previous group-shared 
experience. In the model, shared experience has two effects prominent in evolutionary biology and game the-
ory: one on the group survival and another on gene expression. We did not model individual emotions and 
the sense of identity fusion explicitly. (This would not be possible.) That is, in the triad experience → identity 
fusion → action, we model explicitly only experience and action. However our experiments as well as earlier work 
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show that identity fusion comes as a “proximate” mediator in the experience → action relationship. Therefore, our 
results also concern the effects of shared experience on identity fusion.
Previous theoretical research in evolutionary biology has identified a number of mechanisms for the evolution 
of cooperation37–39. Our work brings to light an additional mechanism – conditioning cooperation on shared 
prior experience. In our models, individuals acquire social instincts to contribute to collective actions because 
this increases their fitness over evolutionary time. However evolved social instincts may comprise relatively open 
behaviour programmes that are sensitive to cues such as shared dysphoria, leading to high levels of identity fusion 
and self-sacrificial acts.
Our proximate explanation for self-sacrifice is that dysphoric experiences and the knowledge that they are 
shared with the group61 shape personal identity and the perception that one’s personal identity is irrevocably tied 
to the group. The resulting state of identity fusion enables simultaneous activation of group and personal identity. 
In this light, threats to the group are experienced as threats to self and the drive to defend the group is conse-
quently a form of self-defense24. Our empirical findings across study groups suggest a consistently robust trend 
for dysphoria’s role in extreme cooperation, beyond the effects of group performance or kinship on cooperation 
that have previously been documented.
There has been recent interest in theoretical literature in the effects of variable environment on the evolu-
tion of cooperation62–64 with some studies arguing that populations evolving under harsh environments would 
become more cooperative. Our models are very different in that we consider individual efforts as conditioned on 
previous group experience. Nevertheless there are some parallels in conclusions: we predict that experiencing an 
instance of a harsh environment would trigger more cooperative behavior.
Our modeling results naturally have a number of limitations. For example, to isolate the effects of previous 
experience, we purposely neglected genetic relatedness by randomly forming groups each generation. To simplify 
analysis, we assumed a simple genetic mechanism underlying instinctive behavior in collective actions while 
neglecting cultural effects (and transfer of experience between generations). Studying interactions between iden-
tity fusion, genetic relatedness, and cultural transmission of behaviors will be an important next step.
Our eight experimental studies provide preliminary empirical evidence for our model, as do other previ-
ous studies on the causes and consequences of identity fusion20,22,65. Our empirical findings across study groups 
suggest a consistently robust trend for dysphoria’s role in extreme cooperation, beyond the effects of group 
performance or kinship on cooperation that have previously been documented. However, more experimen-
tal and longitudinal research is required to substantiate the causal claims made by the model. It is also neces-
sary to develop experiments directly contrasting the hypotheses advanced here with alternative explanations. 
Furthermore, our studies have all relied on self-report measures. This is in part because the behavioral variables 
in which we are primarily interested – costly self-sacrificial behaviors – are difficult to measure directly. The use 
of more benign and commonplace behavioral measures (e.g., economic games) do not approximate our interests, 
and are therefore poor proxies. Nevertheless, measuring extreme sacrifice directly is impractical and unethical 
for obvious reasons. Instead we adopt a variety of plausible proxies for extreme sacrifice including identity fusion 
which has been shown repeatedly to motivate endorsement of extreme sacrifice (e.g. using trolley problems) as 
well as actual self-sacrifice in real-world correlational studies (e.g. among insurgent groups in Libya20). Further 
field-based experiments, in which we can set up realistic scenarios for costly sacrifice, are required. Finally, we 
have not tested all the predictions of the model. For example, an intuitive prediction of our model, which we 
have not directly tested here, is that identity fusion will be stronger in small groups than in large groups. This is 
consistent with the observation that soldiers are more willing to die for each other (their unit comrades) than for 
abstract group categories or values (e.g., God and country)66.
Our models are meant to capture conditions faced by our ancestors tens of thousands years ago. As such they 
are not directly applicable to modern groups which have much larger sizes and experience different selection 
regimes. However our argument (which is standard in evolutionary psychology67) is that certain “social instincts” 
in humans that evolved under ancestral conditions can still be expressed under certain conditions (cf. with “spon-
taneous altruism” observed in experiments where subjects are forced to make decisions quickly68).
Understanding the causes of self-sacrifice for a group is a high priority not only for the evolutionary and psy-
chological sciences but also for society at large. The spirit of self-sacrifice for the group has been a driving force 
of many historical events69,70. Many of the world’s ongoing violent conflicts are fuelled by extreme commitment 
to groups. Nevertheless, people show variation in the extent of fusion with their groups15. This heterogeneity 
could be caused by differences in life history, cultural environment, or developmental factors. Certain groups 
have high levels of identity fusion, and certain events and/or experiences can cause higher identity fusion that 
can be exploited to mobilize extreme pro-group behaviors. Understanding altruistic and cooperative behavior 
by individuals and groups is notoriously difficult as there are multiple forces and factors underlying it, including 
kinship, reciprocity, punishment, mutualism, and various cultural beliefs and biases. However if we are to address 
such pressing social issues as suicide terrorism, holy wars, gangland violence, and other forms of intergroup 
conflict, we should take into account psychological predispositions conditioning extreme cooperation on shared 
past experiences.
Methods
Numerical simulations. We treated individuals as sexual haploid. To implement selection, we used the 
two-level Fisher-Wright framework40,42,71. Specifically, group selection is captured by making each group in the 
new generation to independently descend from a group in the previous generation with probability proportional 
to Sj. Individual selection within each group is implemented by first independently choosing 2n parents from the 
group members with probabilities proportional to payoffs fij and then producing n offspring assuming free recom-
bination. [Results with completely linked genes are qualitatively similar]. Offspring production was followed by 
random mutation and then by random dispersal of nG offspring among G groups.
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In numerical simulations we considered all possible combinations of the following parameters: benefit of 
collective action b = 0.5, 1.0, 2.0; cost of collective action c = 0.5, 1.0, 2.0; group size n = 4, 8, 12 (refs 52,53); rela-
tive importance of previous experience h = 0.2, 0.5, 0.8, and the proportion of groups with dysphoric experience 
π = 0.2, 0.5, 0.8. Parameters that did not change are: number of groups G = 1000, mutation rate μ = 0.0001, and 
the standard deviation of mutational effects σ = 0.5. To simplify the comparison of the two games we set the 
half-saturation parameter Z0 = 1 and made the total contested benefit in “us vs. them” games equal to bG, so that 
that the expected benefit per group is b as in “us vs. nature” games. We ran simulations for 20,000 generations 10 
times for each combination of parameters (see the SI for more details).
Experiments. Individual study methodologies, including scale items, as well as individual study data anal-
yses are detailed in the SI. All studies involving human participants were conducted in accordance with APA 
guidelines and regulations for conducting psychological research. In addition, methods and experimental pro-
tocols were approved by the University of Oxford’s Central University Research Ethics Committee, the Murcia 
University Ethical Committee, or UNSW Human Research Ethics Advisory Panel C. Informed consent was 
obtained from all participants.
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